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[redacted]

Claim Request.

SE-10506-62
Copy 8 of 10
about 26 Oct. 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Resumption of TACKLE

REFERENCE: Action Memorandum No D-55

GENERAL AND SCIENTIFIC

1. Probably the most important aspect in justifying the resumption of TACKLE is the potential threat Communist China poses for the free world countries of Southeast Asia, Taiwan, and to a considerable extent the Republic of Korea. Although relatively large forces are deployed in East China opposite Taiwan which undoubtedly will be maintained there, considerable military activity which should be detectable in aerial photography would necessarily have to occur before any large-scale overt Communist invasion of Southeast Asia or the Korean Peninsula could be successfully launched.

2. While indications of hostile intent can normally be expected from other sources such as COMINT, an accurate assessment of intentions would depend largely on information provided by photo coverage of key installations. A case in point is the [redacted] 25X1D

25X1D [redacted] Only after several photo missions had been flown was it possible to conclude with relative certainty that no invasion against the Offshore Islands was going to take place. However, in any similar situation developing in the future we would be at a loss to assess accurately the degree and significance of military activity without photo coverage.

This document contains information relating to Project [redacted] - TACKLE

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3. In addition to improving US preparedness to cope with Peiping's intentions in specific areas of military concern, aerial photography has been one of the main sources of economic intelligence since the usual sources of economic data from the mainland dried up over two years ago. Detailed photo intelligence provided by TACKLE has been a vital source of information on the identification of new plants, mines, and transport facilities as well as an invaluable aid in assessing the level of economic activity in specific installations. Repeated coverage of the major industrial areas will be necessary to pinpoint significant changes in the pattern of economic activity.

4. TACKLE has also yielded significant information, which at present is not being procured by any other source, in certain strategic and scientific fields. In the air defense area, data on SAM installations, fighter bases, capabilities, and tactics, and the whole air defense system function have been products of these missions. Any long term stand-down of the program will result in a serious loss of intelligence, and it will make it increasingly difficult to assess the growth of Chinese Air Defense capabilities. It should be noted that not only do the flights collect data directly, but they stimulate the air defense system which then results in collection of significant information by other means. Positive intelligence results which have come from these flights include the discovery of the cruise missile installations in north China, the assessment of the progress made at the Shuang Ch'eng-tzu Missile Test Range and the identification of a transformer substation at Lanchow. This information would not have been available without these missions.

PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS

5. In considering the resumption of TACKLE, in addition to its general ability to monitor developments, there are certain specific areas which either have not been covered adequately previously or require coverage. The principal of these, not

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in order of priority are:

a. The Szechuan Basin - still a prime search area for [redacted] and an important area of industrial activity.

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b. The nuclear sector of the Taiwan Straits area - of continuing interest because of its nearness to an area the U. S. is committed to defend and can be covered on entrance and exit from inland flights.

c. Military installations and lines of communication pertinent to the Southeast Asia build-up.

d. Chinese-Indian border areas, particularly around Bat'ien (31°N, 80°E) - of special interest because of current fighting and possible future developments; because of distance problems, basing would have to be resolved;

e. Area surrounding Shih Hsa (38°15'N, 114°30'E) - site of most recently discovered SA-2 site;

f. Hsu Chang (28°40'N, 115°50'E) - location of 9 September 1962 loss of U-2;

g. Reconnage of:

(1) Chuang Ch'eng-tzu - Missile Test Range;

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[redacted]

(3) General areas of Liaotung Wan and Korea Bay where cruise missiles were located.

6. The current crisis over Cuba argues against using the previous behavior of the Soviets or Chinese Communists as an indication of their reaction to renewal of overflights at this time. It cannot still be argued that renewal would be sufficiently important in the total scheme of events either to impel them to a particular action or to deter them from one they would undertake in any case. It is our estimate that the Soviets and Chinese would exploit resumption of overflights as one part of their general case against American belligerency, but that this would not make a great deal of difference.

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7. On 19 October OSR speculated that, under conditions then obtaining, resumption of overflights would probably not have a significant effect upon world tensions. Events since then make us feel that U-2 activity over China is less likely than ever to attract strong attention and govern the reaction of the bloc or any other group of nations to more crucial events elsewhere.

Recommendation

8. It is recommended that COMIN be instructed to review and revise its targets for TACKLE and that the Special Group be asked to approve reactivation of TACKLE. COMIN has already listed early warning targets in the area and thereas coverage of these should have precedence, we must recognize that the constant threat of Communist China and the general inadequacy of other intelligence coverage argues strongly for the use of TACKLE to establish a base line and to provide periodic coverage of important targets.

RAY S. CLINE
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

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